Nonjoinder of Husband in Wife\u27s Deed: Applicability of Estoppel by Carlan, Cabell B.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 3 Article 11 
5-1-1970 
Nonjoinder of Husband in Wife's Deed: Applicability of Estoppel 
Cabell B. Carlan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Cabell B. Carlan, Nonjoinder of Husband in Wife's Deed: Applicability of Estoppel, 24 U. Miami L. Rev. 705 
(1970) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol24/iss3/11 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
CASES NOTED
Today, the flagrant abuses arising from the one-bank holding com-
panies have attracted the concern of Congress. While these abuses must
be rectified, legislation in this field will not eliminate the need to reeval-
uate all bank control of industry. The words of President Nixon con-
tained in a message accompanying his proposal to regulate one-bank hold-
ing companies apply to all bank control of commerce and industry:
"Left unchecked, the trend toward combining of banking and business
could lead to the formation of a relatively small number of power centers
dominating the American economy .... .54
By acceding to the discretion of the respective governmental reg-
ulatory agencies, the court in the instant case has increased the urgency
for congressional action.
ALLEN FULLER
NONJOINDER OF HUSBAND IN WIFE'S DEED:
APPLICABILITY OF ESTOPPEL
Real property was conveyed to the coplaintiff, a married woman,
who twice conveyed by deed this same tract of land without the joinder
of her husband as required by statute.1 The first deed, wherein the words
54. 5 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS No. 13, 61 (1969).
1. FLA. STAT. § 693.01 (1967): "Any married woman owning real property may sell,
convey or mortgage it as she might do if she were not married, provided her husband
join in such sale, conveyance or mortgage."
FLA. STAT. § 708.04 (1967): "The husband and wife shall join in all sales, transfers
and conveyances of the property of the wife, other than personal property and choses in
action."
FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1967):
Every married woman is hereby empowered to take charge of, and manage
and control her separate property, to contract and to be contracted with, to sue
and be sued, and to sell, convey, transfer, mortgage, use and pledge her property,
real and personal, and to make, execute and deliver instruments and documents of
every character, without restraint, without the joinder or consent of her husband,
in all respects as fully as if she were unmarried. Every married woman, without the
joinder or consent of her husband, shall have and may exercise all rights and
powers with respect to her separate property, income and earnings, and may enter
into, obligate herself to perform, and enforce contracts or undertakings to the
same extent and in like manner as if she were unmarried; provided, however, that
no deed, mortgage or other instrument conveying or encumbering real property
owned by a married woman shall be valid without the joinder of her husband;
provided, further, that any claim or judgment against any married woman shall
not be a claim or lien against such married woman's inchoate right of dower in
her husband's separate property.
The purpose of having the husband join is said to be primarily for the protective
benefit of the wife and secondarily for the welfare of the husband by preventing the wife,
without his consent, from conveying real property which would be detrimental to the
welfare of their mutual marital interest. See In re Jensch, 134 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
Serious doubts as to the constitutionality of these statutes are raised by FLA. CONST.
art. X, § 5, as amended in 1968:
There shall be no distinction between married women and married men in
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"a single woman" appeared, was executed in 1947 and recorded in 1958.
The second deed, without any marital status mentioned, was executed
and recorded in 1956. In 1959, the two grantees conveyed, each by
separate deed, to the defendants. In 1969, the wife and her husband
brought an action in ejectment against the defendants. Judgment was
entered for the defendants. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held, reversed: A married woman's deed without joinder
of her husband is void and therefore cannot be given effect by the
doctrine of estoppel in the absence of a statute permitting it. Holwell v.
Zofnas, 226 So.2d 253 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
Estoppels are generally said to be of three kinds: (1) by deed; (2)
by matter of record; 2 and (3) by matter in pais. The first two are also
called legal or technical estoppels, as distinguished from the third, which
is known as equitable estoppel.'
Estoppel by deed is commonly said to be a bar which precludes one
party to a deed and his privies4 from asserting as against the other party
and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from deny-
ing the truth of any material facts asserted therein.5 It is difficult, how-
ever, to prescribe a definition of universal application in regard to what
is called equitable estoppel,6 because it depends on the particular facts
the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and
personal; except that dower or curtesy may be established and regulated by law.
Notwithstanding this provision, a clear "distinction" in the treatment of conveyances
by married men and married women exists under the present statutory scheme. A deed from
a married man without his wife's joinder is not "void" but passes title subject to her dower
right of one-third interest in fee simple which is dependent upon her surviving her husband
and duly filing an election to take dower. As of the date of this note, the issue has not been
resolved in the courts and none of the statutes have been changed by the legislature.
The problem is not presented in the instant case since the conveyances were made prior
to 1968. If the statutes are declared unconstitutional, however, or repealed by the legislature,
the primary issue in this case of whether the doctrine of estoppel is applicable to a con-
veyance by a married woman wherein her husband does not join would not arise in cases
involving conveyances made after 1968.
2. Estoppel by matter of record is defined as "Etihe preclusion to deny the truth of the
matters set forth in a record, whether judicial or legislative, and also to deny the facts
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction." Watson v. Goldsmith, 205 S.C. 215, 223,
31 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1944). Estoppel by matter of record is not an issue in the instant case.
3. Estoppel in pais and equitable estoppel are generally recognized as convertible terms.
See Brown v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 136 N.J. Eq. 430, 439, 42 A.2d 474, 480
(1945), modified, 137 N.J. Eq. 507, 45 A.2d 668 (1946); State ex rel. Squire v. Murfey,
Blossom & Co., 131 Ohio St. 289, 299, 2 N.E.2d 866, 870 (1936).
4. Privity in the law of estoppel has a different and narrower meaning from privity in
contract. It concerns merely the succession of rights. See Coral Realty Co. v. Peacock
Holding Co., 103 Fla. 916, 138 So. 622 (1931); Murrelle v. Broughton, 142 Ga. 41, 82 S.E.
456 (1914).
5. For similar definitions, see Hart v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 69 Mont. 354,
358, 222 P. 419, 421 (1924); Talley v. Howsley, 170 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943),
aff'd, 142 Tex. 109, 176 S.W.2d 158 (1944).
6. This difficulty was recognized in Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v.
Claughton, 86 So.2d 775, 790 (Fla. 1956):
Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pals is a term applied to a situation where,
because of something which he has done or ommited to do, a party is denied the
right to plead or prove an otherwise important fact. Any more exact or complete
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of the case. It is generally defined as that species of estoppel which
equity places upon a person who has knowingly made a false representa-
tion or a concealment of material facts to a party ignorant of the truth
of the matter, with the intent that the other party should act upon it and
with the result that such party is actually induced to act upon it to his
detriment.'
In First National Bank v. Boles,8 a distinction between legal and
equitable estoppel was clearly made, the court quoting from 21 C.J.S.
§ 119:
Legal estoppel excludes evidence of the truth and the equity of
the particular case to support a strict rule of law on grounds of
public policy. Equitable estoppel is admitted on exactly the
opposite ground of promoting the equity and justice of the indi-
vidual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights
under a general technical rule of law, when he has so conducted
himself that it would be contrary to the equity and good con-
science for him to allege and prove the truth.9
Application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed is not unrestricted. It is
an essential element of such estoppel that the deed itself be a valid
instrument. A void deed is inoperative and may not be the basis of an
estoppel by deed. 10
definition than this is difficult to formulate for the reason that an equitable
estoppel rests largely on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and
consequently, any attempted definition usually amounts to no more than a
declaration of an estoppel under those facts and circumstances. The cases them-
selves must be looked to and applied by way of analogy rather than rule.
Similarly, in Davis v. Evans, 132 So.2d 476, 481 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961), cert. denied, 136
So.2d 348 (Fla. 1961), it was said:
No more exact connotative definition, covering all the cases [involving estoppel],
can be attempted, and . . . it is better to leave a more general definition of the
term to the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.
7. For similar definitions, see Baker-McGrew Co. v. Union Seed and Fertilizer Co.,
125 Ark. 146, 150, 188 S.W. 571, 572 (1916); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Mc-
Murry, 278 Ky. 238, 244, 128 S.W.2d 596, 600 (1939); Roberts v. Friedell, 218 Minn. 88,
96, 15 N.W.2d 496, 500 (1944).
8. 231 Ala. 473, 479, 165 So. 586, 592 (1936). See also Trustees of Internal Improve-
ment Fund v. Claughton, 86 So.2d 775, 791 (Fla. 1956).
9. 231 Ala. at 479, 165 So. at 592, quoting 21 C.J.S. Estoppel § 119 (1920).
10. Maury v. Jones, 25 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1928); Sims v. United Auto Supply Co., 221
Ala. 383, 129 So. 53 (1930); Smith v. Ingram, 130 N.C. 100, 40 S.E. 984 (1902), aff'd, 132
N.C. 959, 44 S.E. 643 (1903).
Although this broad rule is often stated, certain "void" deeds have been made the basis
of an estoppel by deed. First, estoppel by deed has been applied where the deed was
invalid in the sense that some technical defect in execution rendered it inoperative. For
example, in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939), aff'd,
144 Fla. 744, 198 So. 681 (1940), cert. denied 314 U.S. 614 (1941), estoppel by deed was
applied against a married woman who failed to meet a statutory formality in executing a
mortgage. Although the mortgage was technically void, she was estopped to deny its
invalidity. Similarly, in City of Tarpon Springs v. Koch, 142 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962),
cert. denied, 155 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1963), it was held that a government agency was subject
to the rule of legal estoppel from later denying the deed even though it was technically void
for noncompliance with charter requirements of a freehold election to sell realty.
Second, deeds "void" because no title existed in the grantor at the time the property
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At common law, a married woman, by virtue of her contract dis-
ability," was incompetent to make a conveyance of real property by
deed.' 2 Thus, whatever power of contract a married woman has is purely
statutory. Today, statutes in many states provide that the married woman
may, by executing a deed in accordance with the statute, convey title
and interest in real property as effectively as though she were a single
woman.' 8 However, failure to comply with the statutory requirements in
the execution of the deed, such as that her husband join therein, renders
it invalid. Such a deed is generally said to be void. 4
On the basis of the foregoing, the courts conclude that a married
woman who executes a deed either in absence of, or contrary to, the
requirements of a statute enabling her to do so is not estopped by deed
from denying its validity.'5 Their reasoning is that estoppel would, in
effect, allow the married woman to do indirectly what she cannot do
directly and would dispense with the limitation the law has placed upon
her capacity to alienate real property.
Despite the often inequitable result, the view taken by some courts
is that a married woman is also not equitably estopped for the same
was conveyed are given effect by the doctrine of after-acquired title. The deed is held to
estop the grantor from setting up an after-acquired title. See Butler v. Bazemore, 303 F.2d
188 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Daniel] v. Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1950) ; Colorado Trout Fisheries
v. Welfenberg, 84 Colo. 592, 273 P. 17 (1928); Bliss v. Tidrick, 25 S.D. 533, 127 N.W. 852
(1910).
But where the deed is void because the party executing it is not sui juris and in-
competent to do so, it is the majority rule that the doctrine of estoppel by deed is inap-
plicable. See Harrell v. Powell, 25 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960); Lewis v. Apperson, 103
Va. 624, 49 S.E. 978 (1905).
11. Ankeney v. Hannon, 147 U.S. 118 (1893); Hogan v. Supreme Camp of American
Woodmen, 146 Fla. 413, 1 So.2d 256 (1941). The wife's disability is based on the merger
of her legal existence with that of her husband. At common law, husband and wife become,
by marriage, one person, and the entire legal existence of the woman is completely merged
or incorporated in that of the husband.
12. See, e.g., Taylor v. Swafford, 122 Tenn. 303, 123 S.W. 350 (1909).
According to English common law, the only way in which the real property of a mar-
ried woman could be conveyed or encumbered was by a fine of record or the suffering of a
common recovery in which her husband concurred. This practice was never widely accepted
in American courts and was soon abandoned, although it was the forerunner of the substi-
tute practice of a deed of a married woman in which her husband joins.
13. E.g., FLa. STAT. § 693.01 (1967).
14. Cornell v. Ruff, 105 Fla. 504, 141 So. 535 (1932); Phillips v. Lowenstein, 91 Fla.
89, 107 So. 350 (1926); Wilkins v. Lewis, 78 Fla. 78, 82 So. 762 (1919). At least one
Florida case seems to contradict the holdings which state that the deed is void:
Consider the case of Hill v. Lummus [123 So.2d 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960)]. 0
made a gratuitous conveyance to M, a married woman, to defeat creditors. Then
M conveyed without the joinder of her husband to A, a party designated by 0.
Later M, joined by her husband, conveyed the same land to B on the representa-
tion that the land would go to O's estate. It was held that 0 and her administrator
were estopped from claiming that the property belonged to the estate on the
ground that the conveyance to M was invalid as a fraudulent conveyance, and
although the deed to A was void because of the husband's nonjoinder, title was
nevertheless quieted in A (the grantee of the "void" deed), and the deed to B
was cancelled. Boyer, Real Property Law, 16 U. MIAmI L. REv. 139, 151 (1961)
(Florida Survey).
15. See, e.g., Ingram v. Easley, 227 N.C. 442, 42 S.E.2d 624 (1947); Daniel v. Mason,
90 Tex, 240, 38 S.W. 161 (1896).
CASES NOTED
reasons."6 It has been held that the statute requiring her husband to join
in the deed provides the exclusive method of alienation and "no theory
of estoppel against her is permitted to weaken or render ineffective the
statute.'7
It appears to be the law in Florida that a married woman who con-
veys without adhering to the statutory requirement that her husband
join in the deed is not estopped by deed from asserting its invalidity. This
conclusion is based upon the express holdings of Wilkins v. Lewis'" and
Phillips v. Lowenstein.'9 A contrary rule would have the effect of nullify-
ing the statute in every case in which a married woman conveyed without
her husband's joinder. Therefore, the court in the instant case was
correct in refusing to apply estoppel by deed. The dissenting judge as-
serted that, in light of cases decided subsequent to Wilkins and Phillips,
all void deeds may be made the basis of estoppel by deed.2" The judge
overlooked, however, the important fact that these later cases involved
the application of the doctrine of after-acquired title,2' and therefore
are not authority for the proposition that estoppel by deed is applicable
where the deed is void because of the grantor's inherent incompetency.
The court also refused to employ the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
In doing so, it relied on Wilkins, Phillips, and Bryan v. Dennis.22 Con-
sidering language used by the Florida Supreme Court to the effect that
"equitable estoppel rests largely on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case," and that cases must be applied "by way of analogy
rather than rule, ' it is difficult to justify the weight given to Phillips
and Bryan. The Phillips case is easily distinguished on the basis of the
fact that in that case the wife was not a party. In the instant case, she
is invoking the court's process, in an action of ejectment, to regain
property for herself and her husband. In Bryan, a deed of manumission
was void because bond was not given as required by law for transporta-
tion of the slaves out of the state. It was held that the ancestors of the
grantor were not estopped from asserting any property right in these
slaves.
It is true that the Wilkins case, wherein a married woman made false
representations as to her marital status, is analogous; but another case,
which was not mentioned in the court's opinion, is an even stronger
16. See, e.g., Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960); Buford v. Mochy,
224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944) ; In re Haines' Estate, 356 Pa. 10, 50 A.2d 692 (1947).
Contra, Bernard v. Jefferson County Inv. and Bldg. Ass'n, 65 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933), aff'd, 128 Tex. 97, 95 S.W.2d 1307 (1936); Wilson v. Beck, 286 S.W. 315 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926).
17. Newman v. Borden, 239 Ala. 387, 389, 194 So. 836, 837 (1940).
18. 78 Fla. 78, 82 So. 762 (1919).
19. 91 Fla. 89, 107 So. 350 (1926).
20. Holwell v. Zofnas, 226 So.2d 253, 256, 257 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (dissenting
opinion).
21. See note 10 supra.
22. 4 Fla. 445 (1852).
23. See note 6 supra.
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
precedent. In Ponce de Leon v. Day,24 it was held that a married woman
who conveyed property after her divorce was estopped from asserting in
her action for ejectment, brought by her against a subsequent purchaser,
that the divorce decree was void and her conveyance did not pass title.
Thus, in effect, she was allowed to convey without her husband's joinder
as required by statute.
Conceding that the statute restricting the wife's ability to convey
would be circumvented by its application, strong arguments remain for
permitting the doctrine of equitable estoppel to be utilized to prevent
results such as the one in the case at bar. Unlike estoppel by deed, the
application of which would give every deed from a married woman effect
and would render the statute completely nugatory, equitable estoppel
would apply only to situations where it would be inequitable and unjust
to permit the married woman to deny the validity of her deed. For ex-
ample, it would not be inequitable if the purchaser was on actual or
constructive notice of the marriage.25
Is the necessity of having the husband join in his wife's deed so
much more sacred than other legal requisites so as to preclude the
selective use of this equitable tool, the purpose of which is to prevent
injustice and guard against fraud?2 6 In Shivers v. Simmons,27 wherein
equitable estoppel was applied to a married woman whose deed was void
because of lack of private examination and acknowledgement, the court
stressed this point in relation to the real purpose of equitable estoppel
in language well worth quoting at length:
It is suggested by counsel that our decision virtually works
a repeal of the statutes regulating the conveyance by married
women of their real estate. . . . An equitable estoppel, so far
from operating to repeal the law, proceeds upon a full recogni-
tion of the legal rights of the party against whom it is invoked,
but declares that his conduct has been such that he shall not
claim the benefit of the law. The court says to him, in effect,
We [sic] admit your legal title, but we shall not permit you to
assert it, because it would be a fraud for you to do so. Is this
repealing the law? If so, then Statute of Frauds, of Limitations,
of Registration, of Wills, and of every other conceivable char-
acter, have, time out of mind, been abrogated by Courts of
Chancery. It is not too much to say that no statute was ever
drawn sufficiently rigid in its terms to preclude a court of
24. 90 Fla. 197, 105 So. 814 (1925).
25. See Bernard v. Jefferson County Inv. & Bldg. Ass'n, 65 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933), aff'd, 128 Tex. 97, 95 S.W.2d 1307 (1936).
26. Dunn v. Fletcher, 97 So.2d 257, 261 (Ala. 1957); Ennis v. Warm Mineral Springs,
Inc., 203 So.2d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), cert. denied, 210 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1968); 3 J.
PoumOy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 176, 178 (5th ed. 1941); 3 J. STORY, EQUITY JURiS-
PRUDENCE 569, 570 (14th ed. 1918).
27. 54 Miss. 520 (1877).
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equity, under some circumstances, [from] prohibiting a party
from claiming its benefits.28
In conclusion, it is this writer's opinion that the court erred in re-
fusing to hold the plaintiffs equitably estopped from asserting title.
Equitable estoppel should be used in those cases where the court deter-
mines that justice will be served by its application; strict refusal to do
so leaves open the door for fraud.
CABELL B. CARLAN
28. Id. at 522-23.
